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Introduction
This Essay strives to advance the current international movement to
deter the transnational corrupt practices that have long burdened the
*
Professor of Law, Duke University. The theme of this Essay was presented to a
session of the Inter-University Council Program on Public and Private Justice in Dubrovnik,
Croatia on May 24, 2009 and to a panel of the Law & Society Association Meeting in Denver,
Colorado on May 28, 2009. The possible relevance of the American experience to the current
international concern was first presented at a 2007 conference at the Duke Law School. The
corresponding paper was published as Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for
Lincoln’s Law Abroad, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 109 (2007). It was presented again at a
Conference on the Civil Law Consequences of Corruption at the Centre for European Law and
Politics at the University of Bremen in Germany on March 15, 2008. That preview of this
Essay was republished in The Civil Law Consequences of Corruption 37 (Olaf Meyer
ed., 2009). The earlier presentations did not advance the proposal presented here. But this
Essay has benefited from helpful reactions and conversations at each of the four presentations
to very different conferees, but especially to those attending the Bremen conference. Todd
Miller helped as an editor and research assistant. Jennifer Behrens of the Goodson Library at
Duke has also been a great source of help.
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global economy and weakened governments, especially in “developing”
nations. Laws made in the last decade to address this longstanding global
problem have not been effectively enforced. Described here are the moderately successful efforts in the United States since 1862 to reward
private citizens serving as enforcers of laws prohibiting corrupt practices. It is suggested that this American experience might be adapted by
international organizations to enhance enforcement of the new public
international laws.

I. The Transnational Corruption Problem
The weakness of many governments caused in part by their vulnerability to corruption is a misfortune having serious transnational
consequences. Given the rise of terrorism and piracy in weakly governed
lands, and the declining physical condition of the planet we share, one
need not be an ardent humanitarian to be concerned about the spreading
deterioration of governments in many former imperial colonies. The
promotion by the World Trade Organization and its antecedents of free
trade in the global marketplace has conferred many benefits, but few of
these have been received by the peoples of “developing countries.”1
A root problem for many failing or weak states is that they are disserved by officials seeking personal kickbacks on anything that can be
bought from or sold by their government, including mineral leases, medical supplies, textbooks, building construction, roads, railways, tourism
concessions, new airports, agricultural equipment, or even imaginary
enterprises and activities.2 And the corrupt ruling elites who receive these
bribes often protect themselves by investing their proceeds overseas, not
at home, thus contributing yet further to the attrition of the economy of
the peoples they purport to serve.3
The problem of corruption may be especially grave in nations endowed with natural resources highly valued by people in wealthier
nations.4 Americans in 2010 know from current experience that firms
extracting minerals are sometimes careless about the natural environ1.
See generally Robert E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal
System (1987); Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System (Chantal Thomas &
Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
2.
Robert I. Rotberg, The Challenge of Weak, Failing, and Collapsed States, in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World 83, 87 (Chester A.
Crocker et al. eds., 2007).
3.
Id. at 86.
4.
See generally Leslie Holmes, Rotten States?: Corruption, Post-Communism
and Neoliberalism (2006); International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006).
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mental consequences of their extractions,5 perhaps especially when mining or drilling in nations distant from their own, but the concern of ruling
elites about those consequences is in many nations likely to be quite limited and reconciled by the personal rewards they receive as controllers of
governments unable to deter either the corruption or environmental recklessness practiced by foreign firms. The World Bank calculated that
bribes totaling a trillion dollars were paid in 2002.6 A large share of that
amount was undoubtedly paid to officials of weak governments by firms
that extract and export natural resources for sale in the developed world.
And much of the foreign aid to such nations provided by the World Bank
or the International Monetary Fund seems quite likely to end up in some
officials’ secret bank accounts. It is reasonable to suppose that the corruption of higher officials sets a low moral standard disabling effective
government at the prosaic levels of law enforcement in “developing”
nations.7 Unless and until means can be devised to deter bribery in failing and failed nations, globalization can be of scant benefit to “the
bottom billion”8 identified by Professor Collier, who are destined to be
governed weakly, if at all. Their ungoverned states will continue to export poverty and serve as havens for all sorts of gangsters, pirates, and
terrorists.

II. The American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
A. The Limits of Its Public Enforcement
This problem of transnational corruption was first recognized as a
matter for international concern in the United States during the Cold
War.9 American firms had long been free to bribe foreign officials in violation of the foreign country’s laws to induce those officials to invest
public funds in American goods or services or to supply access to local
resources. It was fair to assume that such payments were sometimes
5.
For an account of recent events in the Gulf of Mexico, see Liz Judge, Another Oil
Explosion in the Gulf: Enough is Enough, unearthed (Sept. 2, 2010, 2:32 PM), http://
unearthed.earthjustice.org/blog/2010-september/another-oil-explosion-gulf-enough-enough;
see generally Earle A. Ripley et al., Environmental Effects of Mining (1996).
6.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Governance and Corruption, in Global Crises, Global
Solutions 301, 301 (Bjørn Lomborg ed., 2004).
7.
A contemporary reflection on the relationship of law enforcement to basic human
conditions is Gary Haugen & Victor Boutros, And Justice for All: Enforcing Human Rights for
the World’s Poor, Foreign Aff., May–June 2010, at 51, 52.
8.
The phrase belongs to Paul Collier. See, e.g., The Bottom Billion: Why the
Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (2007).
9.
Donald R. Cruver, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Guide for U.S. Firms Doing Business in the International Marketplace vii, 1–12 (2d
ed. 1999).
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indispensable conditions of foreign trade by the American firms because
contracts were often given to the highest bidder, i.e. the firm offering the
10
biggest bribe. In the United States, bribes paid to foreign officials were
long regarded as expenses deductible against income for income tax
purposes, regardless of their illegality under foreign law,11 and thus were
in a special sense subsidized by the government.
The Watergate scandal and the misuse of corporate money to fund
President Nixon’s 1972 presidential campaign led to an investigation by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of reported expenses
that might have been payments made to gain an illicit advantage with
foreign government officials. The investigation coincidentally revealed
widespread use of false accounting methods to conceal bribes paid to
foreign officials.12 The SEC initiated the practice of investigating such
reporting and seeking injunctions to compel companies to make full dis13
closures in the financial statements they distributed to investors. The
SEC also initiated a voluntary disclosure program that led to the revelation that more than 450 companies had concealed at least $400 million
(at least $4 billion in 2010 dollars) in bribes paid to foreign officials in
one year.14 Among the scandals revealed was the payment of $1 million
(at least $10 million by 2010 standards) by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands to secure the sale of a
military aircraft.15
The domestic political reaction to these scandals led to enactment of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) that modified the Securities
Exchange Act to require transparent accounting for payments to foreign
officials by all firms listing their securities on American exchanges.16
Thus, all firms, American or foreign, in which Americans were likely to
invest were made subject to punishment for concealing illegal payments,
10.
For reflections on the problem, see W. Michael Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery,
Crusades and Reforms 151–173 (1979).
11.
The U.S. Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1958 to eliminate the deductability of bribes paid to foreign officials. Pub. L. No. 85–866, 72 Stat. 1606, 1608. That provision
is now codified as 26 U.S.C. § 162(c)(1).
12.
See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n [SEC], 94th Cong., Report of the Securities
and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and
Practices submitted to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
13 (1976).
13.
E.g., SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829–30 (E.D. Wis.
1978).
14.
See Mark Pieth, Introduction, in The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Commentary 7 n.11 (Mark Pieth et al. eds., 1997).
15.
Obituary: Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, BBC News (Dec. 2, 2004, 8:17
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/749465.stm. Also bribed by Lockheed were officers
of the Japanese government. See Gerald L. Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics 163
(1988).
16.
15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006).
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or offers of payment, to officers of foreign governments as well as those
paid in the United States. It was presumed that shareholders would disapprove and prohibit payments such as that made to Prince Bernhard.
Because the SEC had authority only over firms required to file public accounting statements that might be read by American investors, and
had no authority over competing American firms that were privately
owned, a criminal law to be enforced by the Department of Justice was
also enacted.17 The new law was adopted by a unanimous vote in both
18
Houses of Congress and signed by President Carter in 1977. The criminal law prohibits “corruptly in furtherance of an offer, [any] payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer,
gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value”
directly or indirectly to a foreign official for the purpose of influencing
an official decision of financial consequence to the donor.19 These prohibitions were thus imposed on all American domestic concerns whether
or not they were registered on a stock exchange, so long as any part of
the transaction occurred in the United States (or in its territorial waters),
20
in interstate commerce, or by use of the United States mail. The regulated firms are generally accountable for the corrupt conduct of their
employees.21 But the prohibitions of this 1977 law did not apply to foreign nationals acting on behalf of foreign subsidiaries of American firms
22
if their misconduct occurred outside the United States.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) gave a salute to the
1977 American law when, a year later, it promulgated its Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery.23 The leadership of the Chamber
recognized that bribes paid as a cost of competing in international transactions do nothing for the collective profits of its members or for the
quality of the goods or services they purchase or provide. Unsurprisingly, these ICC rules of business ethics were declared to be “ineffective
17.
For a chronicle of the legislative history, see Cruver, supra note 9, at 1–12.
18.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1 (2006) (first enacted on
Dec. 19, 1977, 91 Stat. 1495).
19.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd–2 (2006). See generally Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New International Norms 7–20 (2005).
20.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(a), 78dd–2(a) (2006).
21.
To some it seems unjust that innocent shareholders should bear a resulting loss
caused by the criminal misconduct of their employees. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul
to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 387 n.4 (1981).
22.
Deming, supra note 19, at 8.
23.
The Rules were amended in 1996 and again in 2005. On their current content, see
Int’l Chamber of Com. [ICC], Doc. No. 194/51, Major Changes Brought by the 2005
Revision of the ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations to Combat Extortion
and Bribery (2005), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/
anticorruption/Statements/revised ICC Rules.pdf.
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as a practical matter,”24 but they were a first international acknowledgment of the radiating adverse global consequences of corrupt
governments disserving weak states.
The FCPA was written only as public law to be enforced by the SEC
and the Department of Justice. No provision was made for enforcement
in civil actions brought by private plaintiffs.25 Until recently, the number
of enforcement prosecutions was never large.26 The Department of Justice was mindful of the adverse consequences of effective enforcement;
it recognized that American investors were rewarded and American
workers found jobs as a result of deals with foreign governments whose
officers often expected to share the bribers’ wealth even if it might impose a cost on the people they were purporting to serve and on the
efficiency of the global marketplace.
But the FCPA had an additional legal consequence. A violation resulting in harm to competing firms exposes the offender to civil liability
under the 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO).27 And unlawful commercial bribery is also a violation of the tort
law of most states if it causes foreseeable harm to a business competitor
28
or others. As Judge Richard Posner opined: “Commercial bribery is a
deliberate tort, and one way to deter it is to make it worthless to the tort29
feasor by stripping away all his gain.” Indeed, it is the sort of deliberate
tort that may expose the wrongdoer to liability for punitive damages,
imposed in the courts of almost any state in the common law tradition.30
As with criminal prosecutions, private claims in American courts for
damages allegedly resulting from violations of the Foreign Corrupt Prac24.
Cruver, supra note 9, at 81.
25.
See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027–30 (6th Cir. 1990).
26.
Deming, supra note 19, at 6. For an example of weak enforcement, see Mark Levin, Lighting Up the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Case Study of U.S. Tobacco Industry
Political Influence Buying in Japan, 34 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 471 (2009), discussing
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company’s affairs in Japan.
27.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006). Cf W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Techtronics
Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (holding that the Act of State doctrine does not bar private
claims). See also Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Société Nationale des Pétroles du Congo, No. 05
Civ. 5101(LAP), 2006 WL 846351 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) (denying defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)
claim).
28.
See, e.g., Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 958 (2003).
29.
Williams Elec. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2004). But cf.
Kevin E. Davis, Civil Remedies for Corruption in Government Contracting: Zero Tolerance
Versus Proportional Liability (Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2009/4, 2009),
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/130 (advocating a proportional liability approach,
rather than a zero-tolerance approach, to deal with bribery).
30.
For a full account of this tradition, see Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages
(5th ed. 2005). See also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Historical Fiction: Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics of Ideas (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 9618, 1996).
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tices Act have been few. Yet the prospect of civil liability imposed by
private firms who lose business to a corrupting competitor,31 or perhaps
even by a defrauded government, may have enhanced the deterrent effect
of criminal law.
A recent example of such a civil action brought by a foreign government in an American court is that brought in 2009 by the Republic of
Iraq in federal court in New York against ninety three defendants alleged
to have participated in frauds associated with the United Nations oil-forfood program. It is reported that Iraq seeks $10 billion as compensation
for what it describes as “the largest financial fraud in human history.”32
The claim seems plausible. Its attorneys may be serving for fees contingent on success. Representing a civil plaintiff, they will have access to
discovery. Iraq bears little risk of being required to reimburse the defendants should its lawyers fail to prove its case. And the defendants’ assets
may be found in the United States and seized if necessary to collect a
money judgment favoring Iraq.
Public enforcement of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act has improved in the 21st century. Enlargement of the role of the SEC
was initiated by the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995.33 That law
imposed a duty on auditors to detect and disclose corrupt practices.34 The
auditor is no longer permitted to rely on personal confidence in the integrity of the audited firm, but must investigate the integrity of the firm’s
reporting of payments made.35 In addition, the SEC has commenced the
practice of requiring firms listed on American exchanges to disgorge
36
profits proven to be derived from corrupt deals.
31.
See, e.g., Korea Supply, 63 P.3d 937; Williams Elec. Games, 366 F.3d 569.
32.
Iraq’s Legacy Lawsuit, The FCPA Blog (May 6, 2009, 8:38 PM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/5/7/iraqs-lawsuit-legacy.html.
33.
Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (2006)).
34.
See id. § 301 (adding Section 10A Audit Requirements to the Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78a).
35.
See generally Deming, supra note 19, at 373–78 (discussing the duties of auditors).
36.
See SEC, SEC Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Seimens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery with Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of
Over $1.6 Billion, Litigation Release No. 20829 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20829.htm (announcing that Siemens agreed to pay
$350 million in disgorgement); SEC, SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery; Charges
Halliburton Co. and KBR, Inc. with Related Accounting Violations—Companies to Pay Disgorgement of $177 Million; KBR Subsidiary to Pay Criminal Fines of $402 Million; Total
Payments to be $579 Million, Litigation Release No. 20897A (Feb. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm (announcing that Halliburton and
KBR agreed to pay $177 million in disgorgement). See also David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International
Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L.
471, 482–88 (2009) (discussing the SEC’s increased efforts to disgorge). For a brief summary
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The Department of Justice then also substantially enlarged its efforts
to enforce corrupt practices law.37 Those efforts seem to have abundantly
reimbursed the national treasury. It is reported that American businesses
creating joint ventures with Chinese companies or acquiring Chinese
outfits are especially exposed to the risk of prosecution because of the
38
probability that their ventures are corrupt. And now, for the first time,
the Department of Justice has begun to prosecute individual officers of
firms who participate in the briberies and, along with the SEC, to require
their employers to disgorge profits from deals acquired by their crimes.
Among those successfully prosecuted is a member of Congress who is
alleged to have negotiated a corrupt deal with Nigeria on behalf of an
American firm.39
Two of the cases advanced by the SEC and the Department of Justice warrant special note. One is the case against the Halliburton
Company that disgorged $559 million in 2009 as punishment for its corrupt practices in Nigeria.40 Albert Jack Stanley, who managed the
Halliburton subsidiary under the supervision of Richard Cheney, then the
41
Halliburton CEO, faced an extended sentence for his firm’s bribery of
public officers in Nigeria and bargained for a reduced sentence by be-

of the accounting standards imposed by the SEC, see Deming, supra note 19, at 21–27, 373–
84.
37.
See Carrie Johnson, U.S. Targets Bribery Overseas; Globalization, Reforms Give
Rise to Spike in Prosecutions, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 2007, at D1. They may be more willing to
enforce criminal laws prohibiting money laundering, wire and mail fraud, and conspiracy laws
in the context of bribery allegations. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Twenty-Two
Executives and Employees of Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in
Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2010/January/10-crm-048.html; Ashby Jones, Another Individual Falls in DOJ’s FCPA RampUp, Wall St. J. Blog (Feb. 11, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/11/
another-individual-falls-in-dojs-fcpa-ramp-up/; George J. Terwilliger, Corrupt Payments
Abroad: FCPA and Other Risks, Nat’l L.J., June 2, 2008, at 12.
38.
Sheri Qualters, Risk of Bribe Probes Grows for Business, Nat’l L.J., Jan. 9, 2008,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1199786732205.
39.
David Stout, Ex-Louisiana Congressman Sentenced to 13 Years, N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 2009, at A14 (Congressman Jefferson was convicted and sentenced to thirteen years in
prison. The prosecutor had sought a sentence of twenty-seven years.). See also Marcia Coyle,
Jefferson Case Shows SEC, DOJ Targeting Individuals: Foreign Corrupt Act Case Reflects a
Trend, Nat’l L.J., June 11, 2007, at 6.
40.
The company paid $382 million to the Department of Justice and $177 million to
the SEC. Press Release, Halliburton Company, Halliburton Announces Settlement of Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Investigations (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/
press_release/2009/corpnws_021109.html.
41.
Stanley was designated by Cheney to be president of the Halliburton subsidiary
Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) in 1998. The bribes to Nigerian officials had commenced in
1995 and continued until 2004, when Stanley was fired. See Russell Gold, Halliburton ExOfficial Pleads Guilty in Bribe Case, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 2008, at A1.
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coming a witness against his firm.42 Halliburton, long centered in Houston, moved its corporate headquarters to Dubai in 2008, apparently in the
43
hope of reducing its exposure to federal law enforcement. Its continuing relationships in Iraq are not presently the subject of criminal
proceedings, but they are appropriate subjects of continuing investigations.44
Also to be noted is the prosecution of the German firm, Siemens,
whose registration with the SEC exposed it to federal prosecutions for
bribes paid to the Nigerian government, resulting in a $1.6 billion fine
paid by Siemens to the United States for corrupt practices in numerous
nations.45 That prosecution came on the heels of a German prosecution.46
And the Department of Justice in January 2009, for the first time initiated a proceeding to recover funds received as a bribe paid by Siemens
to the son of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh and held in a bank account in Singapore. This appears to be the Department’s first effort to
retrieve a bribe paid to a foreign official.47 The event seems perhaps to
have alerted the Liberian government to the possible use of American aid
in tracking its officials who have benefited from corruption in that nation.48
But still there are constraints on enforcement of such laws by public
officials. Because of their adverse domestic economic consequences, such
federal prosecutions can be politically very difficult for the prosecutors in
the United States Department of Justice. For example, James Giffen, an
American citizen, was indicted in 2003 for bribing President Nursultan
42.
Laolu Akande, Halliburton’s Ex–Chief Ready to Testify in Nigeria, Guardian (Nigeria), Apr. 14, 2009. Sentencing of Stanley has repeatedly been postponed. Sentencing
Report for Q2 ’10, FCPA Blog (July 1, 2010, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/
2010/7/1/enforcement-report-for-q2-10.html.
43.
See Charlie Cray, Halliburton Takes the Money and Runs Away, Huffington Post
(Mar. 13, 2007, 11:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlie-cray/halliburton-takes-themon_b_43304.html.
44.
See Jim Donahue, Iraq for Sale: The War Profiteers, HalliburtonWatch (Oct.
10, 2006), http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/news/iraqforsale.html; Pratap Chaterjee, Is Halliburton Forgiven and Forgotten? Or How to Stay Out of Sight While Profiting From the War in
Iraq, CorpWatch (June 3, 2009), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15372.
45.
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Seimens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008294.htm.
46.
See Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, Where Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 21, 2008, at B1.
47.
Chasing Dirty Money, The FCPA Blog (Jan. 11, 2009, 6:28 PM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/1/11/chasing-dirty-money.html. See also Press Release, Dep’t
of Justice, Department of Justice Seeks to Recover Approximately $3 Million in Illegal Proceeds from Foreign Bribe Payments (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2009/January/09-crm-020.html.
48.
Liberia’s Graft-Busting Leader, The FCPA Blog (June 9, 2009, 8:48 PM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/6/10/liberias-graft-busting-leader.html.
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Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan on behalf of Mobil, Texaco, Phillips/Conoco,
and BP. His alleged offense gained public attention in 2000.49 After four
years of investigation, Giffen was charged with thirteen counts of violating
50
the FCPA and thirty-six counts of criminal money laundering. President
Nazarbaev, who has been a friend of American foreign policy in the Middle East, was critical of the prosecution, perhaps sensing that he could
even lose his office as a result of it.51 Prospective government witnesses
were even said to have received death threats.52 In his defense, Giffen alleged that he had been regularly debriefed by United States government
officials, and claimed that “by the time of the transactions at the heart of
the indictment, [he] understood himself to be working not only for the
government of Kazakhstan, but also for . . . United States government
53
agencies.” The Justice Department moved to preclude the defendant from
advancing the defense that he was acting on public authority, or to use information classified as secret by the government agencies said to be
involved. The trial court denied the motion to preclude the defense, but did
not rule on the motion regarding government secrets. On appeal by the
prosecution, the court of appeals, after nearly a year of deliberation, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the trial court order to be reviewed
lacked the finality essential to appellate jurisdiction.54 The trial has been
55
repeatedly postponed. It will perhaps be held some day, but maybe

49.
For a full account, see Steve LeVine, The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of
Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea (2007). See also Robert Baer, See No Evil:
The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism 241–42 (2002).
50.
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, American Businessman Charged with $78
Million in Unlawful Payments to Kazakh Officials in 6 Oil Transactions; Former Mobil Corp.
Executive Indicted for Tax Evasion in Kickback Scheme (Apr. 2, 2003), available at
www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/April03/giffenwilliams.pdf.
51.
Marlena Telvick, United States vs. James H. Giffen, Int’l Freedom Network
(May 20, 2004), http://ifn.org.uk/article.php?sid=2. The indictment also alleged that Swiss
authorities had begun “investigating accounts ‘nominally owned by offshore companies but
beneficially owned, directly or indirectly, by Balgimbayev and Nazarbayev . . . into which Mr.
Giffen had made tens of millions of dollars in unlawful payments’ in 1999.” Id.
52.
Peter Crisell, Kazakhstan: A Khanate Revived, newnations.com, http://
www.newnations.com/specialreports/kazakhstan.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
53.
United States v. Giffen, 473 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2006).
54.
Id. at 37.
55.
Steve Levine, James Giffen’s First Line of Defense Appears to Fall, The Oil and
the Glory (May 2, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/blogs/russia_oil_politics/
archives/2009/05/james_giffens_f.html/. Meanwhile, another American, Mark Seidenfeld
has been accused of corrupt practices in Kazakhstan on behalf of a different client.
His investigation was dropped in 2007, but then reopened. A sympathetic assessment of the
latter case is Following Acquittal, New False Charges Are Pending Against
Mark Seidenfeld, HelpMark Seidenfeld and Boycott Ducat (Aug. 29, 2007, 3:06
PM), http://savemark.wordpress.com/2007/08/29/following-acquittal-new-false-charges-arepending-against-mark-seidenfeld/.
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Kazakhstan is too important to the United States for the Department of
Justice to continue the case.56
57
The Giffen case, although extraordinary, illustrates a fundamental
difficulty with the public enforcement of any law forbidding bribery of
foreign officials. The responsible public officers so engaged are required
to punish their fellow citizens, with whom they may have diverse connections and shared interests, and to whom they owe their official status,
in order to protect a distant government with whom they have no connection.

III. The Internationalization of Laws
Deterring Corruption
In the last decade of the 20th century, other nations, in conformity
with the encouragement of the International Chamber of Commerce,
began to align themselves with the 1977 American policy of imposing
criminal punishment on their citizens who bribe officers of foreign gov58
ernments. The international campaign had its origins in the Asian
financial crisis of the 1990s. That event elevated interest in international
regulation of trade to provide greater stability in developing economies.
The United States was especially interested in persuading other nations
to join in deterring transnational bribery in order to level the playing
field for American firms constrained by its FCPA from offering the best
bribes to the foreign officials seeking them. As a result of its urging and
the concerns heightened by the crisis, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1997 promulgated a new international Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions.59
This OECD Convention obligates signatory nations to enact criminal
laws with a “functional equivalence” to those it prescribes, and to
56.
James Giffen and America’s Secrets, The FCPA Blog (July 15, 2009, 8:12 PM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/7/15/james-giffen-and-americas-secrets.html.
57.
For example, in a similar case, Frederic Bourke was convicted in October 2009 of
allowing his agent in Azerbaijan to bribe officials and was denied a new trial. United States v.
Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
58.
See J. Ndumbe Anyu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Catalyst for
Global Corruption Reform (2007); Deming, supra note 19, at 93–130.
59.
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions art. 1.1, Nov. 21, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1. See
also Deming, supra note 19, at 85–100. For a brief account, see Lucinda A. Low & William
M. McGlone, Avoiding Problems Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. Antiboycott
Laws, OFAC Sanctions, Export Controls, and the Economic Espionage Act, in Negotiating
and Structuring International Commercial Transactions 200–03 (Mark R. Sandstrom & David N. Goldsweig eds., 2003).
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cooperate with the enforcement efforts of other signatory nations.60 In
support of the latter obligation, a system of private peer review was
established that subjects signatory nations to periodic reviews by teams
of specialists from at least two other states.61 One substantive difference
between the OECD Convention and the FCPA is that the Convention
does not forbid campaign contributions to foreign candidates for public
office, as the FCPA does.62 And the Convention is silent on any
obligation of signatory nations to enact accounting and record-keeping
standards corresponding to those enforced in the United States by its
Securities Exchange Commission.63
The 1997 OECD Convention marked the beginning of an international movement based on the premise that we all have a stake in the
64
integrity of the global marketplace that deserves the protection of law.
Much energy and rhetoric is now being expended around the globe in
campaigns to protest and deter transnational corrupt practices. The campaign may be heard in such venues as the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, the United Nations, the International Chamber of
Commerce, the International Bar Association, and non-governmental
institutions such as Transparency International and Global Witness that
are devoted to resisting transnational corruption of governments and
courts. German observers have also expressed support because of concerns that German firms engaged in corruption abroad may have brought
the practices home, i.e., that “globalization has become a motor for corruption in Germany.”65
In response to the OECD Convention, the American FCPA was
amended again in 1998 as the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act66 in order to bring American law into accord with the
60.
See OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions ¶ 2 (1997), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf.
61.
Peer review is said to be “at the heart of the ‘trade’ of the OECD.” Fabrizio Pagani,
Peer Review: A Tool For Co-Operation and Change, An Analysis of an OECD Working Method, OECD SG/LEG(2002)1 (Sept. 11, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/33/16/ 1955285.pdf.
62.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1 (2006).
63.
The OECD Convention is silent on accounting practices. See Weiss, supra note 36,
at 478–80; cf. supra note 34.
64.
See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, supra note 59, Preamble. See generally Deming, supra note 19, at 93–
130.
65.
So we are told by a German prosecutor. Carter Dougherty, Germany Battling Rising
Tide of Corporate Corruption, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2007, at C1.
66.
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd, et seq. (2006)). On the state of the
law at that time, see Symposium, Review of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on Its Twentieth
Anniversary: Its Application, Defense and International Aftermath, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus.
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Convention.67 One substantive change made for this purpose was legitimize “grease” payments, i.e. small rewards or tips paid to lower-ranking
officers “to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action.”68 In some weak states, such “grease” payments may
indeed be important to the operation of impoverished governments.69
Another reform was an extension of the law to criminalize bribes paid to
70
officials of “public international organizations.” And foreign nationals
working for American firms were brought within the group subject to
criminal liability for illicit payments or offers of payment. But those
working for foreign subsidiaries were still not included, leaving open a
means of evasion of federal law that surely remains in use.
While the United States was thus strengthening its efforts to address
the global problem, thirty-six nations had ratified the OECD Convention
within a decade.71 These included the governments of most of the major
players in international commerce, except China. Also, in 1997, the Organization of American States promulgated the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption,72 which is even more explicit in requiring ratifying states to enact specified criminal laws. In 2002, the Council
of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption entered into force,
with forty-six signatories.73 In 2003, the African Union opened for signa74
ture its similar convention. In 2006, the European Union adopted a
resolution calling for the return of assets of illicit origin to nations victimized by corrupt practices.75
263 (1998); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 229 (1997).
67.
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, supra note 59.
68.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd–2(b) (2006). See, e.g., How to Grease a Palm; Bribery, Economist, Dec. 23, 2006, at 115 (noting that tactful strategies are used to ensure that bribes go
undetected).
69.
See generally J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 417 (1967) (suggesting that the rewards of corrupt practices
may sometimes serve the public interest by motivating some officials).
70.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd–2 (2006).
71.
See Public Procurement: Spotting the Bribe, OECD Observer Mar. 2007, at 11,
12.
72.
Deming, supra note 19, at 101–04.
73.
Id. at 105.
74.
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003,
43 I.L.M. 5 (2004).
75.
See Second Comm. of the Gen. Assembly, Draft Resolution, Preventing and Combating Corrupt Practices and Transfer of Assets of Illicit Origin and Returning Such Assets, In
Particular to the Countries of Origin, Consistent with the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/61/L.53 (Dec. 1, 2006) (submitted by Aboubacar Sadikh Barry).
See also EU Explanation of Position—Preventing and Combating Corrupt Practices and
Transfer of Assets of Illicit Origin, Consistent with the UN Convention on Corruption (Dec. 6,
2006), available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6571_en.htm.
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Also in 2003, the United Nations opened its Convention Against
Corruption76 negotiated in Vienna by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
It has been ratified by over one hundred nations and is also now in
77
force. Its general tone is reflected in Article 19:
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the abuse of functions or
position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act,
in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or
her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage
for himself or herself or for another person or entity.
A similarly tentative tone is expressed in the UN Convention’s suggestions that each State Party take action to proscribe deliberate
78
79
concealment of bribes or obstruction of justice, and provide for civil
80
liability “as may be necessary.” It was said that this UN Convention,
while diffident, would be a “focal point” of the United States’ campaign
against corruption.81

IV. Problems with Public Enforcement of the
New International Conventions
One may admire the sincere efforts of all those who have secured the
promulgation and ratification of these international conventions and still
question whether they are effective in deterring corruption of public officials, or perhaps merely express “a hollow commitment.”82 A thorough
empirical study revealing an effect on the realities of weak governments

76.
U.N. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct.
31, 2003); Deming, supra note 19, at 114–23.
77.
Press Release, U.N. Info. Serv., United Nations Convention Against Corruption
Receives 100th Ratification (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/
pressrels/2007/uniscp548.html.
78.
U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 76, art. 24.
79.
Id. art. 25.
80.
Id. art. 26.
81.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau for Int’l Narcotics & Crime Control, U.S.
Contributes $500,000 to Support Implementation of the U.N. Convention Against Corruption
(Dec. 13, 2004), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/other/39714.htm.
82.
Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Transparency Int’l, Progress Report 2009:
Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions 9 (2009), available at http://
www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2009/oecd_pr_2009.
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has not been conducted, but the available data points to a conclusion that
“enforcement must be re-energized.”83
The impediments to enforcement by public officers are obvious and
notably illustrated in the Kazakhstan case in the United States. Are public prosecutors in the nations signing a convention likely to be vigorous
in prosecuting their fellow nationals or local firms that employ many of
their fellow nationals? For paying a bribe to a foreign official in order to
secure a contract or other benefit that will indirectly serve the interests of
their fellow nationals and their own national economies? How much effort can national prosecutors reasonably be expected to expend
investigating possible violations of such international criminal laws? Vigorous prosecutors risk being seen by fellow citizens as ungrateful and
unpatriotic. And how much money will parliaments and legislatures facing competing demands on public resources vote to appropriate to fund
such investigations and prosecutions? Can the system of peer review established by the OECD secure adequate answers to these questions? And
when impoverished nations invest the needed resources and moral commitment to accuse and convict their officials and the foreign nationals
who bribed them, can they expect that OECD nations in which the convicted foreigners have come to reside will assist in imposing
punishments on their own countrymen? Corruption is easily denied, and
exposure generally requires serious investigative effort requiring energy
and public resources. There are inevitably present in all such matters
competing needs for attention and the usual risk that the resources, if
applied elsewhere, might better serve the public good.84
The weakness of the global resolve to punish foreign corrupt practices through criminal laws enforced by public servants has been on
display in numerous places. For example, despite the disincentives,
prosecutors in Lesotho, at the urging of the World Bank, sought in 2000
to punish Canadian, French, and Italian nationals and their firms for corrupt practices related to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.85 As a
result of the prosecutors’ efforts, the World Bank debarred one firm from

83.
Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Transparency Int’l, Progress Report 2008:
Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions 8 (2008), available at http://
www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/4th_oecd_progress_report.
84.
See, e.g., In Denial: Corruption in Romania, Economist, July 5, 2008, at 62 (reporting the impediments to and costs of enforcement in Romania).
85.
See Nicol Degli Innocenti, Lesotho Highlands Bribes Trial Starts, Int’l Rivers
(June 5, 2000), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/lesotho-water-project/lesothohighlands-bribes-trial-starts. For a general account of the project see Korinna Horta, The
Mountain Kingdom’s White Oil: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project, 25 Ecologist 227
(1995).
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further participation in projects funded by it.86 And convictions in Lesotho
resulted in penalties imposed on some subsidiary corporations, but the
convicted foreigners apparently remain at large. The European Anti-Fraud
Office (OLAF) did supply some data on the parent corporate defendants,
but other help to Lesotho was not forthcoming.87 Such events are obviously discouraging to prosecutors in developing nations who need to
consider competing needs for their scarce professional resources.
In 2004, the United Kingdom, having recently enacted its criminal
law as required by the OECD Convention, initiated an inquiry into bribes
allegedly paid by BAE Systems, the British weapons firm, to secure contracts with the government of Saudi Arabia. In November 2006, it was
reported that Saudi Arabia, perhaps inspired by the Kazakhstan experience in the United States, threatened to break diplomatic relations with
the United Kingdom if the investigation was not dropped.88 The next
month, the investigation was dropped after the British government determined that “ ‘the wider public interest’ ‘outweighed the need to
maintain the rule of law.’ ”89 The action was defended by those calling
attention to the need to secure the help of Saudi Arabia in dealing with
Palestinian affairs and to secure thousands of jobs of workers hired to
perform the corrupt contract,90 considerations said to overbalance the
rule of law. Mr. Blair’s successors were told by the High Court of Justice
91
in 2008 to reconsider his decision to discontinue the investigation, but
on appeal the House of Lords affirmed the Prime Minister’s action in
92
calling off the prosecution. A “summit” conference was held in London
86.
See World Bank Debars Acres International Limited (Acres), Int’l Rivers (June
23, 2004), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/lesotho-water-project/world-bankdebars-acres-international-limited-acres.
87.
Fiona Darroch, Lesotho Highlands Water Project: Corporate Pressure on the Prosecution and Judiciary, in Transparency Int’l, Global Corruption Report 2007:
Corruption in Judicial Systems 87, 90 (Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007).
88.
David Leppard, Blair Hit By Saudi ‘Bribery’ Threat, Sunday Times (London),
Nov. 19, 2006, at 1.
89.
David Leigh & Rob Evans, ‘National Interest’ Halts Arms Corruption Inquiry,
Guardian, Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/dec/15/saudiarabia.armstrade.
90.
See Barefaced, Economist, Dec. 23, 2006, at 18; but see Alan Cowell, British Contractor Paid Saudi, Reports Say, N.Y. Times, June 6, 2007, at A3 (giving a later account of the
incident); Heather Timmons & Eric Pfanner, Blair Defends Ending of Graft Inquiry; Investigation of Saudi Arms Deal a National Security Risk, He Says, Int’l Herald Tribune, Dec.
16, 2006, at 3; Kevin LaCroix, Corrupt Practices, National Security and the Rule of Law, The
D&O Diary (Apr. 11, 2008), http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/04/articles/foreign-corruptpractices-act/corrupt-practices-national-security-and-the-rule-of-law/.
91.
The case against the action was brought by an NGO, the Campaign Against Arms
Trade. The court thanked the organization for bringing the action. See High Court Re-Opens
Saudi Arms Corruption Investigation, Ekklesia, Apr. 24, 2008, http://ekklesia.co.uk/
node/7051.
92.
Christopher Hope, SFO Was Right to Call Off BAE-Saudi Corruption Probe, Law
Lords Rule, Telegraph.co.uk, July 30, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
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in 2009 to explore the options and train business leaders to confront the
issues.93 That conference was apparently a part of a trend of presenting
94
other such “summit” conferences. In October 2009, the case was reopened by the Serious Fraud Office. In February 2010, the Office was
able to secure an admission from BAE that it had concealed payments
made to middlemen, resulting in a fine of roughly $50 million. But what
made this possible was BAE’s confession of guilt under the United
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and payment of a $400 million fine
to the United States.95 The Serious Fraud Office has yet to demonstrate
the will to punish the corruption of foreign officials by British firms
seeking to gain an advantage for the Office’s fellow countrymen.
Anti-corruption laws do have a better chance of being locally enforced when a new regime takes over the corrupted government in that it
might reveal the dealings of its predecessors. This happened in Nigeria
in 200796 and led to the investigation of Siemens by the German government enforcing its new foreign corrupt practices law enacted pursuant to
the international initiatives. It appeared that in 2006, Siemens’ Nigerian
subsidiary had acquired a contract to build a power sector by paying perhaps $21 million to Nigerian officials to close the deal.97 Exposed in
2007, the firm not only lost a contract but also its parent firm became the
object of criminal investigations in Germany and the United States,
where its stock is traded and it is subject to the corresponding laws governing accounting in publicly traded firms. The German parent firm
cooperated in the investigation and won a measure of restraint on the
part of the prosecutors.98 It appears that it had budgeted $40 to $50 million a year in bribes paid to Nigerian officials from 2002 to 2006.99

middleeast/saudiarabia/2473629/SFO-was-right-to-call-off-BAE-Saudi-corruption-probe-lawlords-rule.html.
93.
See Ethical Corp., The UK Anti-Corruption Summit 2009, http://www.
ethicalcorp.com/ukethics (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
94.
E.g., Ethical Corp., The 3rd Annual Global Anti-Corruption Summit USA, http://
www.ethicalcorp.com/globalethics (last visited Aug. 30, 2010); Ethical Corp., The Future of
Anti-Corruption Law & Enforcement in Europe, http://www.ethicalcorp.com/eulegal (last
visited Sept. 20, 2010).
95.
See Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark, BAE Settles Allegations of Bribery, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 2010, at B1.
96.
President Umaru Yar’Adua assumed office in May 2007, promising to rid the nation
of the squalor of corruption. A contract with Siemens Nigeria for a supply of circuit breakers
was cancelled in December. Nigeria Suspends Siemens Dealings, BBC News (Dec. 6, 2007,
10:40 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7130315.stm (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
97.
See Siemens faces Nigerian bribery inquiry, BizTech Africa (June 18, 2010, 6:00
AM), http://www.biztechafrica.com/section/business/article/siemens-faces-neigerann-briberyinquiry/47/.
98.
Schubert & Miller, supra note 46.
99.
Id.
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As noted, the parent firm has now paid fines of $1.6 billion to the
governments of Germany and the United States for its corrupt practices
in many nations. Siemens has declared its intent never to do it again. But
will future officers of Siemens keep that promise in mind? If so, can it
compete successfully with firms less constrained by their governments?
Is it reasonable to expect that Siemens’ experience will suffice to deter
other firms from other nations with less vigorous and less well-endowed
prosecutors? A blacklisting of Siemens has been lifted and in 2008 it
acquired new contracts with Nigeria to construct its power sector.100
It is reported that France, like Germany, has become actively engaged in anti-corruption law enforcement.101 That may be the reality
throughout the European Union. Nevertheless, a skeptic may well doubt
that the criminal laws pose a very serious threat to most of those firms
around the world whose profits, indeed perhaps their economic viability,
seem to depend on their willingness, or at least the willingness of their
subsidiaries and their local officers, to participate in the corruption of
foreign officials to secure markets for their goods or services. Of course,
such criminal laws express a moral judgment, and businessmen are not
immune to moral suasion. But as Adam Smith noted as a predicate to his
celebration of the marketplace, moral constraints lose force as they are
applied over greater distances.102 The moral force of such international
law is therefore chronically weak. And corrupt practices are by definition
secret crimes that can be prevented or deterred only by vigorous investigation and forceful legal sanctions that may not be forthcoming.
In recognition of the problem of weak public enforcement of criminal laws, the Council of Europe in 1999 adopted the Civil Law
Convention on Corruption. Its aim, as stated by the Council, is to take
“into account the need to fight corruption and in particular provide for
effective remedies for those whose rights and interests are affected by
corruption.”103 Signatories are obliged to authorize civil actions for compensation of firms damaged by corrupt practices.104 This Convention
entered into force in 2003. It provides for actions for compensation to
100.
Nigeria: Halliburton, Like Siemens, AllAfrica.com (Apr. 21, 2009), http://
allafrica.com/stories/200904210245.html. See also Siemens—Unworthy Causes, TradingMarkets.com (May 6, 2009, 7:09 AM), http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/
Stock%20News/2310866/.
101.
Robert A. Goldspink et al., Morgan Lewis, Anti-Corruption Laws in Europe: A Review of 2008 (2009), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/LIT_Webcast_AntiCorruptionLawsInEurope_21jan09.pdf.
102.
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 136 (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1759).
103.
Civil Law Convention on Corruption art. 3, Nov. 4, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 174,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm.
104.
Eur. Consult. Ass., Explanatory Report to the Civil Law Convention on Corruption
¶ 1(a)(6) (1999), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/174.htm.
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the defrauded government, such as that of Iraq in the oil-for-food scandal,105 for all damages suffered as a result of corruption.106 It also
107
provides for the protection of whistle blowers, the acquisition of evi108
109
dence, and provisional remedies. In addition, it requires transparency
in company accounts110 and strives to promote international co-operation
and monitoring.
With this Convention, the Council of Europe acknowledged the need
for a civil enforcement mechanism imposing real adverse economic
consequences on firms that bribe foreign governments. Civil liability is
surely important to deter firms from bribing one another’s corporate officers in the private sector. The integrity of many other governments calls
for a similar and plausible threat of civil liability. But while the Civil
Law Convention is a significant step forward, reports of civil actions
against offenders are few.
Primary attention seems to be given to the possible but seldom practiced invalidation of contracts tainted by corruption as the civil sanction
to be imposed pursuant to the Convention. Such a civil contract action
would presumably be brought by uncorrupted officers of the corrupted
government to secure compensation for the economic loss suffered by
their governments as a result of the corrupt practice. To date, no effort
appears to have been made to bring the Council of Europe into line with
the law of the United States recognizing bribery of foreign officials by
American firms as a tort111 subject to punitive damages112 in proceedings
brought by competitors who lost government contracts as a result of a
113
defendant’s payment of a bribe, or by victimized governments such as
114
Iraq.
Thus, while the Civil Law Convention takes steps in the direction of
civil enforcement, they seem insufficient to enlist private enforcement to
deter European firms motivated by the marketplace to engage in corrupt
115
practices, except possibly for the most blatant misdeeds. Notwithstanding the possibilities that remain open, the enactments of the United
105.
See supra text accompanying note 32.
106.
Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 103, art. 3.
107.
Id. art. 9.
108.
Id. art. 11.
109.
Id. art. 12.
110.
Id. art. 10.
111.
See generally The Civil Law Consequences of Corruption (Olaf Meyer ed.,
2009).
112.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2001).
113.
See, e.g., Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937 (Cal. 2003).
114.
See supra note 33.
115.
The United Kingdom might be an exception. See Kary Klismet, Quo Vadis, “Qui
Tam”? The Future of Private False Claims Suits Against States After Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 283, 287–88 (2001).
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States and other nations since 1998 conforming to all these conventions
might be regarded as a benign gesture but one of apparently quite limited
consequence. If an act of transnational corruption should attract substantial public notice, the signatory nations have empowered themselves to
stand on the side of integrity in government by conducting a criminal
prosecution, or, in Europe, maybe even entertaining a civil contract action against their nationals who offend. The United States is no longer
alone in taking that moral stand. And perhaps the enactments will serve
to enlarge the force of moral suasion against corrupt practices. But the
threat of adverse consequences for those engaged in transnational bribery, even in the United States, is still generally remote and evadable by
most firms.
In response to this situation, the OECD Council in 2009 posted a
new recommendation that member states raise taxes on their firms detected to be engaged in international corrupt practices.116 They also
directed states to increase public awareness of the criminal law, improve
auditing practices, and limit public subsidies and licenses to those firms
more closely observed in their compliance, and who cooperate fully with
the OECD’s peer review system of investigation and accountability.117
And it urged member states “to further examine . . . [the possible use] of
civil, commercial, and administrative laws and regulations, to combat
foreign bribery.”118 This last recommendation confirms the need for international consideration of the American experience with private
enforcement of public laws. Japan, anticipating the Council’s recommendations, initiated a study of the options that is underway in 2010.119

116.
OECD, Working Group on Bribery in Int’l Bus. Transactions, Recommendation of
the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, § III(iii) (Nov. 26, 2009), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/40/44176910.pdf.
This is as opposed to allowing a tax deduction for the cost of bribes paid, as was long the
practice in the United States. Id. § VIII(i).
117.
See generally id.
118.
Id. § III(viii).
119.
Study Panel for Preventing a Recurrence of ODA-Related Corruption,
Towards Preventing a Recurrence of Corruption Related to Official Development Assistance (ODA) (2009), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/anti-corrupt/
prevention.pdf. See also Veronica L. Taylor, Rule-of-Law Assistance Discourse and Practice:
Japanese Inflections, in Law in the Pursuit of Development: Principles into Practice?, 161, 161–79 (Amanda Perry-Kessaris ed., 2010) (providing an account of the Official
Development Assistance program).
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V. The American Experience with Private Enforcement of
Its Domestic Corrupt Practices Laws
The contemporary international problem with corruption is redolent
of American legal history beginning in the 18th century. The new nation’s citizens were then quite familiar with the problem of governmental
corruption. Benjamin Franklin in 1767 observed that “[t]here is no kind
of dishonesty into which otherwise good people more easily and frequently fall than that of defrauding the government.”120 They sensed that
the line of moral conduct for those in public service is not always clearly
drawn. This is so today because to most citizens their government is a
distant anonymity having no moral claim upon themselves. The faint line
between a campaign contribution and a bribe is a premier modern
American example of this lack of clarity.121 Family interests, longstanding friendships, cultural or sub-cultural connections, and political
122
alliances supply other sources of tolerated improprieties.
Mindful of corrupt practices observed in the Continental Congress
that waged the colonies’ war for independence,123 Franklin’s contemporaries in the earliest years of the nation recognized the impediments to
effective public enforcement of laws forbidding corrupt practices. Drawing on longstanding English practice, they allowed private citizens who
had the requisite fortitude to initiate lawsuits and pursue claims in the
name of the United States against any person or firm defrauding their
government.124
120.
Benjamin Franklin, “F.B.”: On Smuggling, London Chronicle, Nov. 21–24,
1767, available at http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (follow “Vol. 14:
1767” hyperlink; then follow “ ‘F.B.’: On Smuggling” hyperlink). See generally Historical
Review of the Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania (1759).
121.
See Andrew Stark, Conflict of Interest in American Public Life 152–77
(2000); cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (holding that it is a denial of due process of law for a state supreme court justice to hear a case involving a party
who contributed three million dollars to his political campaign to secure his judicial office).
But see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 Sup. Ct. 876 (2010) (reflecting the
view of the Court that campaign contributions are free speech, not bribery).
122.
For an especially powerful example, see Alan Smart & Carolyn L. Hsu, Corruption
or Social Capital? Tact and the Performance of Guanxi in Market Socialist China, in Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal Anthropological Perspective 167, 167
(Monique Nuijten & Gerhard Anders eds., 2007).
123.
For example, Samuel Chase (a future Supreme Court Justice), was dismissed from
the Continental Congress for his illicit use of inside information to turn a profit for himself.
See James Haw et al., Stormy Patriot: The Life of Samuel Chase 105–08 (1980).
124.
For accounts of the early legislation and its colonial antecedents, see Linda J. Stengle, Rewarding Integrity: The Struggle to Protect Decentralized Fraud Enforcement Through
the Public Disclosure Bar of the False Claims Act, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 471, 476–81 (2008);
Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 Wash. U. L.Q. 81 (1972). See also
James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Whistleblower Litigation 29–61 (3d ed.,
2002).
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In the 19th century, the English forsook this practice of private enforcement of public law. But it became an important tool of government
in the United States as it remained an unsettled and contentious place not
so unlike many of the 21st century’s “emerging nations.” During its Civil
War in the 1860s, the nation’s Secretary of War, responsible for oversight
of the military striving to suppress the slave states’ secession was dismissed by President Lincoln for paying his friends twice the market
price for cavalry horses that turned out to be afflicted with “every disease
horseflesh is heir to.”125 Such scandals led to the enactment in 1862 of
the False Claims Act, then known as “Lincoln’s Law.”126 That law required the offender guilty of defrauding the government to pay double
damages, half of which would be paid to the “relator,” i.e. the citizen
who commenced and maintained a claim on behalf of the United States
to secure compensation from those engaged in corrupt practices for harm
resulting from the taking of bribes by its officers. Thereafter, numerous
relators came forward in the name of the United States to pursue claims
against private contractors who were proven to have sold the army rifles
without triggers, gunpowder diluted with sand, or uniforms that could
not endure a single rainfall.127
Under the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, “Lincoln’s Law”
was reinforced and made to impose treble damages liability on those
engaged in corrupt practices causing harm to the federal government.128
The 1986 law continues to assure the relator of a substantial reward if
the defendant is shown to have defrauded the government. Indeed, it has
been amended again in 2009 to make it still more attractive for a relator
to “blow a whistle.”129 Brief consideration of that law as a possible model
for international law is therefore timely.
For several reasons, such private enforcement by citizens in civil actions is perceived to be more effective in deterring corrupt practices than
criminal law enforcement. First, as noted, proceedings under the federal
False Claims Act are not criminal proceedings and so proof “beyond a
125.
Henry Scammell, Giantkillers: The Team and the Law that Help Whistle-lowers Recover America’s Stolen Billions 38 (2004).
126.
Federal False Claims Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696–699 (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2009)).
127.
The problem of “war profiteers” persists. Bryan Terry, Note, Private Attorneys
General v. “War Profiteers”: Applying the False Claims Act to Private Security Contractors in
Iraq, 30 Seattle U. L. Rev. 809 (2007).
128.
Pub. L. No. 99–562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3739(a)
(2009)).
129.
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–21, 123 Stat. 1617
(to be codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733). For a brief description of the law’s
effects, see Jesse Lee, Protecting Homeowners, Protecting the Economy, The White House
Blog (May 20, 2009, 6:49 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Protecting-HomeownersProtecting-the-Economy.
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reasonable doubt” is not required; a “preponderance of proof” will, if
credited, suffice to support a judgment against the defendant who
appears to have paid a bribe to an official. Second, the private citizenrelator has, like the public prosecutor, the rights conferred on civil litigants by American rules of civil procedure to compel disclosure of
possible evidence130 and to compel non-party witnesses to supply their
evidence as well.131 Also, much of the government’s files are exposed to
private investigation as a result of the Freedom of Information Act en132
acted in 1966. Furthermore, a relator, unlike a civil plaintiff in England
or most other nations, is ordinarily not liable for the legal expenses of
the defense even if he and/or the government is unsuccessful in proving
the case.133 This is because a relator having a credible claim may secure
private legal counsel without payment, because lawyers are available to
present such claims for compensation that is contingent on their success.134
When a false claims case is filed by a relator in the name of the
United States, the Department of Justice is discreetly informed and invited to take control of the proceeding, but even if it does, the case
continues as a civil action and the private relator remains a party to be
compensated if it is successful.135 If the Department of Justice does not
intervene, the private relator is entitled to maintain the action in the
name of the United States and for its benefit. Such a relator, if successful, is then entitled to receive at least twenty-five percent of the trebled
136
damages, plus reimbursement for costs, including attorneys’ fees. This
can be a very substantial reward for the citizen who comes forward as
the relator. More than a few American relators have in recent years been

130.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37. This right was conferred on all civil litigants by the rules
promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73–415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)). For a compact account of the right to discovery, see Mark
A. Dombroff, Discovery (1986).
131.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
132.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
133.
For an account of the origins of this distinctive “American rule,” see John Leubsdorf, Toward A History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 9 (1984).
134.
See generally F.B. MacKinnon, Contingent Fee for Legal Services: A Study
of Professional Economics and Responsibilities (1964). The origins of this unusual tradition are explained in Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society,
1776–1876, at 278 (1976). Greece is one country that may also allow contingent fees. Eleni
Skordaki & Danielle Walker, Regulating and Charging for Legal Services: An
International Comparison 56 (1994).
135.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2000).
136.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2000).
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able to retire in wealth after revealing frauds on the government, often
those committed by their former employers.137
One constraint is that the relator’s claim must be based at least in
part on his personal knowledge. A provision enacted in 1942 requires a
relator to be an “original source” of at least some of the information on
138
which the claim rests. But pursuant to the recent amendment of the
Act, a relator is not denied compensation when a case commenced by
him or her is won by the government on proof other than evidence that
he or she brought to the court.139 The relator is also provided with rights
protecting him or her from retaliation by an employer.140 However, the
present law does not empower the relator to sue a corrupt officer who
received a bribe.
Examples of successful private actions initiated pursuant to this law
abound. In September 2009, the United States settled a claim against the
Pfizer corporation for its fraudulent practices in selling medicines to
government health care programs for $2.3 billion. The primary
whistleblower, a former officer of Pfizer, was rewarded with a fee of
$51.5 million.141 In a similar case in April, a relator received $48.7
million of the $325 million paid by Northrup Grumman to the United
States to settle a corruption claim arising from a sale of a spy satellite
program. The whistleblower had been an engineer for Northrup.142 The
same week, Quest Diagnostics agreed to pay $302 million for selling the
government faulty diagnostic kits.143 In January, Eli Lilly had paid $1.42
billion for false advertising of an antipsychotic drug sold to patients
spending public funds; nine of its former salesmen were awarded
perhaps as much as $100 million for blowing the whistle and filing the
144
claim in the name of the United States.

137.
Examples abound. See, e.g., Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to
Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotions of Zyprexa, Dep’t of Justice, (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html; Masto Announces $400 Million
Nationwide Settlement with Merck, Nev. Office of the Att’y Gen. (Feb. 7, 2008), http://
www.drugfraudsettlement.com/news/Nevada-Media-Release.pdf; AMERIGROUP Announces
Settlement in Largest Ever False Claims Case, Goldberg Kohn (July 22, 2008),
http://www.goldbergkohn.com/news-firm-1096.html.
138.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
139.
This amendment reverses the holding in Rockwell International Corp. v. United
States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007).
140.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000).
141.
Bill Berkrot, Pfizer Whistleblower’s Ordeal Reaps Big Rewards, Reuters, Sept. 2,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN021592920090902.
142.
Peter Pae, DEFENSE; Northrop, Government End Disputes, L.A. Times, Apr. 3,
2009, at B1.
143.
Quest to Pay $302 Million in Marketing Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2009, at B9.
144.
Eli Lilly Agrees to Settle Zyprexa Marketing Cases, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 2009, at
B4. The whistleblowers’ share is reported by Joe Palazzolo, Lilly Whistleblower Reprises Role
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Over 10,000 false-claim cases have been filed in American federal
courts since the 1986 revision of the law.145 Although historically the
bulk of the false claims actions were directed at those who provide
goods or services to the military, other industries have become frequent
targets for claims. Now, as illustrated by the 2009 examples noted above,
many of the current false-claims cases are brought against health-care
providers accused of overpricing goods or services paid for by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.146
In 2006, Congress enacted a provision to reward states that enact
147
similar laws if applicable to health care providers. As many as thirty
states have done so, as have the cities of New York and Chicago.148
A non-profit organization, Taxpayers Against Fraud, provides tips,
149
information, and support to a variety of relators. It has complained that
the Department of Justice does not invest sufficient resources in the enforcement of corruption law, even failing to spend funds that have been
appropriated specifically for that purpose. Public notice of the 2009
cases might supply that need. But even despite this failing, the false
claims law serves as a useful incentive to private enforcement of the law,
and the result is that corrupt practices are subject to strong deterrence in
the United States. Not enough, to be sure, to prevent corrupt practices
altogether, for, as Ben Franklin affirmed, the temptations are very great,
perhaps especially to officers of vast commercial enterprises who are
expected to concentrate on short-term profits.

in AstraZeneca Case, Main Justice: Politics, Policy and Law (Apr. 27, 2010, 6:42 PM),
http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/04/27/whistleblower-reprises-role-in-astrazeneca-case/.
145.
Scammell, supra note 125, at 304–05.
146.
Marcia Coyle, High Court Vets False Claims Act, Nat’l L.J., Nov. 27, 2006, at 1.
The Department of Justice has now taken a heightened interest in frauds committed by medical doctors and health care executives. BNA, Health Care–Fraud, 76 U.S. L. Wk. 2344, 2344
(2007).
147.
§ 6031 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 190–171, 120 Stat. 4
(2006), amended the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396h, to insert § 1909, providing that
the federal contribution to Medicare programs are to be increased to ten percent for states
enacting appropriate false claims laws applicable to health care providers and added 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396(a)(68)(C), requiring states to include provisions notifying health care employees of
their right to become whistleblowers.
148.
See State False Claims Acts, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund: The
False Claims Act Legal Center, http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2010).
149.
See generally Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund: The False Claims
Act Legal Center, http://www.taf.org (last visited Sept. 20, 20l0).
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VI. The Possibility of Private Enforcement of International
Corrupt Practices Law in National Courts
Might the international institutions seeking to deter transnational
corruption usefully advance the idea of enabling similar private enforcement of transnational corrupt practices laws in the courts of all
nations, or at least those of the “developed nations” of the OECD? The
nations of that organization could agree to enact versions of the American laws offering handsome rewards to those who, as “relators,” expose
transnational corrupt practices of their local firms, in the hope that the
deterrent effect of such law would be spread among firms in all the “developed” nations. Thus, citizens of a victimized state, or anyone with
personal knowledge of the corruption, might be authorized in the name
of the defrauded government to invoke the jurisdiction of any signatory
state to assert corruption claims against any firms or individuals who are
within that state’s jurisdictional reach. Such empowerment of private
enforcement might significantly enhance the deterrent effect of the laws
enacted pursuant to the present Conventions.
The culture shock resulting from such an international agreement
could be less than a reader might suppose. American false claims laws
are not entirely unique. The United Kingdom, Korea, and the Netherlands, and perhaps some other nations, have laws to reward and protect
whistleblowers who alert prosecutors to frauds on their governments.150
India is the scene of much active enforcement of laws resembling the
151
American law. The idea of private claimants representing the English
monarchy has an ancient history152 and European high courts enforcing
constitutions are no strangers to political roles.153

150.
Günter Heine et al., Private Commercial Bribery: A Comparison of
National and Supranational Legal Structures 81 (U.K.), 266 (Kor.), 311 (Neth.), and
648–49 (for a comparative analysis) (2003). It is also reported that Japan has the beginnings of
a movement to enact legislation protecting whistleblowers. Id. at 230.
151.
There are a substantial number of lawyers in India specializing in Qui Tam False
Claims Act cases. See Qui Tam False Claims Act Lawyers in India, http://hg.org/
law-firms/Qui-Tam-False-Claims-Act/India.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). The Cabinet in
2010 approved a bill imposing fines and penalties on those punishing whistleblowers. Cabinet
approves bill to protect whistleblowers, expressindia (Aug. 9, 2010, 8:50 PM), http://
www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Cabinet-approves-bill-to-protect-whistleblowers/657959/.
This legislation appears to be a response to the murder of a whistleblower. See Richard
Renner, Whistleblower murdered in India, Whistleblowers Protection Blog
(Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2010/01/articles/legislation/international1/whistleblower-murdered-in-india/.
152.
See Smith, supra note 102 (observing the ease and comfort with which humans
observe the misfortunes of distant others).
153.
See Karen J. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power 263–86 (2009).
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A. Possible Enforcement of International Law in US. Courts
As the Iraq case illustrates,154 a foreign government may invoke the
jurisdiction of an American court to invoke, in a civil action, international corrupt practices law against firms that bribed the foreign
government’s officials. Thus, the United States could alone simply
amend its foreign corrupt practices law to enable a citizen of another
nation, such as Kazakhstan, to take on the role of a relator to bring suit
in an American court in the name of his government against those oil
companies who have allegedly bribed his president in violation of international corrupt practices law. Such a private plaintiff might be
empowered to recover for the government of Kazakhstan treble damages
from oil companies that paid such a bribe, and the relator might receive a
substantial share as a reward for useful public service.
As noted, the plaintiff suing on behalf of his government could, in an
American court, be represented by a lawyer serving for a fee contingent
on success.155 An advantage of treating the matter as one fit for resolution
in a civil proceeding in an American forum is that the relator or his or
her foreign government (if it took over the case in order seriously to pursue it) would not be required to prove the bribery or the resulting
damages “beyond a reasonable doubt.” A “preponderance of proof”
would, if credited, suffice to support a civil judgment against the defendant. Furthermore, a foreign nation or its citizen-relator pursuing a
corruption claim in the American court could make full use of the right
to conduct discovery. Any evidence available in the United States or in
the possession of an American citizen could be presented at trial. Foreign
government claimants would also share the right to compel disclosure of
possible evidence by the accused firm156 and to compel non-party witnesses within reach of an American court to supply their evidence as
157
well. Discovery of evidence from witnesses and their files in other nations is available in the United States and assisted by many foreign
governments, or at least by those committed to the Hague Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.158 A defendant refusing to provide documents or other evidence upon demand
might be subjected to an adverse judgment on the merits of the dispute
because an American court might reasonably infer that the evidence the
defendant refuses to produce on request would prove the allegation of
154.
Iraq’s Legacy Lawsuit, supra note 32.
155.
See supra notes 136–140.
156.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–37.
157.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
158.
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force
for the U.S. Oct. 7, 1972).
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the adversary.159 And if either the relator or his government is unsuccessful in proving the case, they would ordinarily bear no liability for the
legal expenses of the defense.
In one respect, this idea of invoking the jurisdiction of American
courts is less radical than an international reader might suppose. In the
18th century, the first Congress of the United States conferred jurisdiction on its federal courts to hear claims by foreign citizens alleging
violations of international law.160 While the history of that provision is
dim, it seems likely that its authors were attentive to the problems of protecting foreign diplomats and assisting foreign plaintiffs seeking to
recover their ships or cargo from pirates.161 Whatever the 18th century
concern, the statute is, in the 21st century, used by diverse foreign plain162
tiffs invoking human rights recognized internationally.
163
A foreign government inclined to join Iraq in invoking the jurisdiction of American courts to enforce international law prohibiting the
bribery of its officials might also welcome the opportunity to take over
similar privately initiated cases brought in American courts by its own
citizens serving as relators. For the reasons stated, it might in all respects
be less expensive and more effective for a foreign government or its citizens to proceed in a civil case against a firm guilty of corrupt practices in
an American court than to conduct civil actions in their own forum. Recall the pertinent observation of a judicial member of the House of Lords
who some years ago observed that “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so
is a litigant drawn to the United States.”164 And there is the special attraction of such private enforcement that no public official is required to take
personal responsibility for what may be an impolitic action but which
might enrich their nation’s treasury.
There is no strong reason for the United States to withhold its judicial services from foreign relators or foreign governments in need of an
effective forum in which to present suits to enforce corrupt practices
laws.165 The private lawyers retained to conduct such cases in an Ameri159.
Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 705–09
(1982).
160.
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2006)) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
161.
“Uppermost in the legislative mind appears to have been offenses against ambassadors; . . . violations of safe conduct were probably understood to be actionable . . . and
individual actions arising out of prize captures and piracy may well have also been contemplated . . . .” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).
162.
E.g., Abdullah v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
163.
See Iraq’s Legacy Lawsuit, supra note 32.
164.
Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (Eng.).
165.
See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 Cornell
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
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can court are exposed to substantial income tax liability by the United
States, so that it is not unlikely that the United States would show a net
profit on the sale of judicial services to foreigners bringing such cases to
its courts on behalf of their governments.166 And even if the United States
alone were to amend its law to provide for such private enforcement of
the foreign corrupt practices act by foreign citizens striving to protect
their own governments, the reform would not be without some deterrent
effect.
But, as with the original Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the deterrent
effect of such an employment of American jurisdiction to enable foreign
citizens to enforce international corrupt practices law would be most felt
by firms that are subject to that jurisdiction. There would thus be a cause
for concern for the uneven impact on business competitors.
A second problem with simply extending the present American law
and legal process to relators representing foreign governments is that the
present law assures the victimized government of the opportunity to relieve the relator and take over the conduct of the litigation. It would be
unlikely, to say the least, that public lawyers employed by the government of Kazakhstan, for example, would vigorously pursue claims
arising from bribes allegedly paid to the president of their republic. They
might well, if permitted, seek to exercise control to defeat the claim
without regard to its merit.
And a third problem with invoking the international law in the courts
of the United States is that even if jurisdiction over the foreign defendant
were assured, a resulting civil judgment might be enforceable only
against assets of the defendant that could be found in the United States.
While one might hope that foreign courts would lend a hand in enforcing
the judgments rendered pursuant to such legislation and against firms
that are within the “long-arm” constitutional reach of American courts,
experience suggests that this is unlikely unless a change could be made
in the governing transnational law to commit foreign courts to enforce
judgments rendered in the United States. Recent experience with efforts
at The Hague to reach agreement about the enforcement of foreign
judgments lends scant encouragement to such a hope.167 A serious threat
166.
This would obviously not be true for American jurors summoned to sit on such
cases, especially given the potential complexity of the evidence that might be presented. On
that account, legislation authorizing foreign citizens to sue might perhaps employ the diction
“suit in equity” to bar application of the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. See John
E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 685–86 (8th ed. 2010).
167.
See Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party
Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 543, 549 (2006);
Stephen B. Burbank, Federalism and Private International Law: Implementing the Hague
Choice of Court Convention in the United States, 2 J. Private Intl. L. 287, 288–89 (2006);
Jason Webb Yackee, A Matter of Good Form: The (Downsized) Hague Judgments Convention
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to the enforcement of an American judgment in a transnational false
claims case is a longstanding international tradition that the courts of one
168
nation do not enforce the public revenue or punitive laws of another.
A fourth consideration is that it might be impolitic for the United
States alone to venture forth to provide private enforcement of a global
antibribery and fair competition act that could have no more than limited
effect. Some Europeans, Asians, and Africans may already resent the
pretentiousness of American courts sitting as “world courts” as they are
sometimes prone to do.169 For these four reasons, the United States is not
here encouraged to go forward alone.
B. Private Enforcement in Courts of Other Nations
More effectively, international law might establish a model law extending to other national courts the empowerment of private citizenrelators to sue in the name of their governments those guilty of corrupt
practices, invoking jurisdiction wherever the offender or its assets might
be found. Such a law might be established by an amendment to the
OECD Convention on Civil Consequences requiring similar amendments
to national laws.170
Such an international law might also explicitly empower a party who
has paid a bribe under duress to recover the sum paid to its corrupt official. This might have the benign effect of making public officials less
eager to receive bribes. A relevant example of frustration in the private
enforcement of the present international law deterring corruption is the
2006 decision of an arbitration panel denying compensation to Nasir Ali
for a clear breach of contract by the government of Kenya.171 Nasir Ali
had bribed the President of Kenya to acquire a place of business at the
Nairobi airport for his duty-free shop. But under a successor President,
the Republic revoked the contract and leased the space to a rival foreign
owner. The arbitrators declined to enforce the corrupt contract of Nasir
and Conditions of Formal Validity for the Enforcement of Forum Selection Agreements, 53
Duke L.J. 1179, 1179–80 (2004).
168.
E.g., Planche v. Fletcher, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165 (K.B. 1779); Her Majesty
the Queen v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 1979). But cf. Pasquantino v. United
States, 544 U.S. 349, 352–53 (2005) (holding that a plot to defraud a foreign government of
tax revenue did violate the Federal Wire Fraud Statute).
169.
Ralf Michaels, US-Gerichte als Weltgerichte—Avantgarde der Globalisierung [US
Courts as World Courts: The Avant–Garde of Globalization], 31 Zeitschrift der Deutsch–
Amerikanischen Juristen-Vereinigung [DAJV–Newsletter] 46 (2006) (F.R.G.).
170.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
171.
World Duty Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Arb. 00/7 (Oct. 4, 1996), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf. For commentary on the
responsibility of investment arbitrators to afford civil remedies for bribery, see Abiola O.
Makinwa, Civil Remedies for International Corruption: The Role of International Arbitration,
in The Civil Law Consequences of Corruption, supra note 111, at 257–80.
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Ali and merely expressed frustration that the President who received the
bribe was permitted to keep it. Nothing indicated that the successor
business had not also paid a similar bribe to the president’s successor in
order to secure the repudiation of the contract with Nasir Ali.
If the OECD or the Civil Law Convention were modified to include
an endorsement of such laws generously rewarding citizen-plaintiffs for
representing their governments in matters of transnational corruption,
there would remain the problem that most national courts who would be
asked to hear such claims are less hospitable to plaintiffs bringing such
civil tort cases. And perhaps many would be especially unreceptive to
foreign claimants invoking international or foreign tort law against a
domestic defendant.
It is certain that the numerous features of American law facilitating
private enforcement would in most national courts be unavailable. Few
nations’ courts adhere to “the American rule” that a plaintiff who advances a tort claim but loses is not liable for the defendant’s expenses,
including attorneys’ fees.172 While there are variations on laws governing
attorneys’ fees, plaintiffs in most national legal systems would not be
likely to be permitted to retain counsel for a fee contingent upon his or
her success in the case.173 And while European courts often conduct
penetrating factual inquiries, private plaintiffs are rarely empowered to
conduct private investigations of the sort permitted by the discovery
rules in use in American courts.174 It is also doubtful that a plaintiff in
most nations’ courts would have access to government records of the sort
opened to plaintiffs by “Freedom of Information” or state “sunshine”
legislation in the United States. Furthermore, few judges are empowered
to issue injunctions enforceable by fines or imprisonment for those who
fail to produce needed information or documents. Such limits on private
access to evidence increase the risk to the relator of a costly defeat of the
claim.

172.
See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L.J. 651 (1982) (explaining the legal-theoretical bases for “the
American rule” and pointing out its rarity in the legal systems of the world).
173.
Conditional fees are allowed in the United Kingdom and in the European Commission of Human Rights, but these are modest in amount and limited to personal injury or
insolvency cases. See Michael Zander, Where Are We Now on Conditional Fees?—Or Why
This Emperor is Wearing Few, If Any, Clothes, 65 Mod. L. Rev. 919 (2002); Winand Emons &
Nuno Garoupa, US–Style Contingent Fees and UK–Style Conditional Fees: Agency Problems
and the Supply of Legal Services, 27 Managerial & Decision Econ. 379 (2006).
174.
See Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 Duke J.
Comp. & Int’l L. 61, 74–76 (2003).
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VII. Rewarding Private Enforcement
in International Arbitration
Given the difficulties of adapting many national courts to the role of
enforcing the rights of a foreign state at the behest of one or more of its
citizens, attention ought be given to the possibility of an international
tribunal commanding the respect and acceptance of all the governments
willing to subscribe to the principle that citizens are entitled to protect
their governments from bribes paid by foreign firms. Such an international tribunal might also hear claims by firms presenting evidence that
they could and would have provided goods and services of equal quality
at lower prices than those a state agreed to pay in response to a defendant’s corrupt practices.175
Special dispute-resolving schemes have been incorporated in numerous multilateral agreements,176 including some bearing on
177
environmental controversies. Such a forum could be established and
empowered with the usable features of the American practice empowering private law enforcement by relators and whistleblowers. There is an
existing model for an international forum in which corruption claims
might be heard and decided.
The model is the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous international institution
established by the World Bank under the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States.178 ICSID provides an arbitral forum whose jurisdiction is conferred by the contracts made between member governments and the
foreign firms with whom they deal. The Nairobi airport case mentioned
above was decided by an ICSID panel.

175.
Such a forum might also be a suitable venue to hear tort claims arising from environmental harms caused by careless mineral extractions. See supra note 5.
176.
See Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self–Binding vs. Other–
Binding Delegation, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 37 (2008).
177.
See generally Cesare P.R. Romano, The Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes: A Pragmatic Approach (2000) (analyzing the
conditions under which international adjudication can effectively tackle the challenge of environmental disputes).
178.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1966). For the origins of
the Convention, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 78–125
(2010); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and
Interpretation 19–74 (2010); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and
Transformation, 38 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 47 (2009). For speculation on the future of the
institution, see International Investment Law in the 21st Century (C. Binder et al.
eds., 2009); The Future of Investment Arbitration (C. Rogers & R. Alford eds., 2009).
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There are 144 member states that have ratified the ICSID Convention and are thus subject to the Center’s jurisdiction. Presently, there are
over 120 cases pending on its docket; all involve disputes between firms
engaged in international trade and the member governments with whom
they have made contracts.179 While, as with other tribunals, one may be
180
concerned about the independence of the judges, the Center’s monetary awards are enforceable under the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards181 that has been
182
ratified by all but a very few nations. Thus, its decisions are much
more widely enforceable than mere civil judgments rendered by national
courts.
Given the absence of alternatives and the widely recognized utility
of arbitral tribunals in resolving civil disputes arising in international
trade, the ICSID model is not only the best available, but one worthy of a
measure of public confidence.183 Cautions have been expressed such as
that uttered by Cesare P. R. Romano that while arbitration “has some
merits, it is by and large a vestige of an old world where adjudication
was ultimately regarded as a sort of ‘continuation of diplomacy by judicial means,’ to paraphrase a famous quote from Carl von Clausewitz.”184
But ICSID is more than that as a forum in which pre-existing law is respected and enforced.
179.
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, http://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (for list of member states, follow “Member States”
hyperlink; for pending cases, follow “Cases” hyperlink, then follow “List of Cases” hyperlink,
then follow “Pending Cases” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
180.
See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
181.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention] (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08 (2000)) (entered into force for the
U.S. Dec. 29, 1970).
182.
No nation engaged in substantial trade has failed to ratify the New York Convention. See Status of the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
NYConvention_status.html (listing the status of each state party to the New York Convention).
On enforcement, see generally United Nations, Enforcing Arbitration Awards
Under the New York Convention: Experience and Prospects (1999), http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf (discussing the effectiveness of enforcement, application of the Convention by the judiciary, and potential
improvements to the implementation process).
183.
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Diplomacy, Arbitration, and International Courts, in The
Role of International Courts 51 (Carl Baudenbacher & Erhard Busek eds., 2008) (explaining the advantages of international adjudication relative to arbitration and diplomacy);
Robert H. Smith & Tyler B. Robinson, E-Disclosure in International Arbitration, 24 Arb.
Intl 105 (2008) (commenting on the availability of discovery in traditional international
commercial arbitration).
184.
Cesare P.R. Romano, International Dispute Settlement, in The Oxford Handbook
of International Environmental Law 1036, 1038 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
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It must be conceded that ICSID is not universally revered. The Republic of Ecuador, although presently engaged in an ICSID arbitration
proceeding with Occidental Petroleum arising from the government’s
response to alleged environmental harms resulting from its extractions in
Oriente Province, has now withdrawn its consent to future proceedings
of this sort.185 But if Ecuador seeks future investments in similar enterprises by transnational firms, it will likely find it necessary to submit to a
jurisdiction such as that of ICSID, or a different but similar center established by the World Bank.186 And a defendant nation such as Ecuador
might escape liability by demonstrating that the plaintiff investor was
guilty of bribing its officials.187
If the World Bank were to more aggressively pursue its policy deterring corruption in response to the OECD’s initiative, it might establish an
international arbitral tribunal empowered by contract to resolve corruption
claims brought by suitably qualified citizens or non-governmental organizations against firms or offices engaged in corrupt practices. Nations
becoming members of a center such as ICSID could be required to include
submission to the center’s jurisdiction as a condition of any contract of
size made with a foreign national or a transnational firm or its subsidiary
for their purchase of goods or services, their sale of business opportunities,
or their consent to extractions of minerals. A similar condition of submission to the Center’s jurisdiction could be imposed on those holding high
public offices in a signatory state. Such a reform might be made in pursuit
of the Bank’s broader policy of advancing the rule of law.188
As an additional condition of the submission of corruption claims
to such an arbitral tribunal, a member state would need to establish reasonable accounting standards to be observed by its public officials and
185.
On December 23, 2007, Ecuador withdrew its consent to jurisdiction over matters
“relative to the extraction of natural resources such as oil, gas, or other minerals.” Letter from
Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, Ecuadorian Ambassador to the U.S., to Ana Palacio,
Sec’y Gen., ICSID (Nov. 23, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&Announce
mentType=regular&AnnounceNo=9.pdf.
186.
It is not unimaginable that such a forum could be empowered to resolve tort claims
for environmental harms caused by firms engaged in transnational mineral extractions. On the
shortcomings of traditional legal solutions in the context of environmental law, see Elisa
Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law 25–62
(2009). For a brief account of other presently existing transnational forums and the problem of
occasionally overlapping jurisdictions, see Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public
International Law: Why Competition Among International Economic Law Tribunals Is Not
Working, 59 Hastings L.J. 241 (2007).
187.
Cf. Inceyna Vallisoletana SI v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/26 (Aug. 2, 2006).
188.
Julio Faundez, Rule of Law or Washington Consensus: The Evolution of the World
Bank’s Approach to Legal and Judicial Reform, in Law in the Pursuit of Development,
supra note 119, at 180–201.
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by those international firms with whom they might deal. And, as a
constraint on the misuse of the investigative power conferred on the
party alleging a corruption claim and his or her counsel, it would be
appropriate to require him or her at the outset to identify a personal
source of information suggesting the likelihood of a corrupt practice
worthy of further investigation.
To facilitate effective private law enforcement of international anticorruption laws in such a center, the civil procedure employed would
need to differ from that conventionally employed in the arbitration of
contract disputes, or by the present ICSID arbitral panels. The American
rules of procedure empowering private investigation surely need not be
explicitly incorporated, but they serve to illustrate what would be needed
to empower private counsel to investigate and reveal corruption.189
Thus, it would be necessary to include provisions empowering the
parties’ private counsel to expose pertinent records of the government
and its contracting parties, to examine witnesses under compulsion to
give evidence, and to empower the arbitral panel to render an enforceable monetary award against a firm or person within the represented
state’s jurisdiction who failed to cooperate reasonably with the investigation conducted by counsel for any of the parties.190 Official files and
191
records of represented states would be subject to arbitral scrutiny.
An obvious problem in establishing such a center is the identification of suitable members of the arbitration panels.192 Finding suitably
disinterested decisionmakers is not easy and perfection cannot be
achieved. But the peer review system employed by OECD to encourage
189.
See Tom Barnett, A U.S. Perspective: Convergence of Standards for Information
Exchange in International Arbitration and American Civil Discovery, in Electronic Disclosure in International Arbitration 119 (David J. Howell ed., 2008); but see Michael E.
Schneider, A Civil Law Perspective: “Forget E-Discovery!” in Electronic Disclosure in
International Arbitration, id. at 13 (expressing misgivings about the consequences of
electronic information storage and recovery by investigating parties).
190.
U.N. Comm’n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor & U.N. Dev. Programme,
Making the Law Work for Everyone 64 (2008) concludes that:
In general, the success of alternative dispute resolution depends on certain standards and practices, such as the right of poor people to appoint judges of their
choice for the dispute resolution. But it is equally imperative that the alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms are recognized as legitimate and linked to formal
enforcement, and that they do not operate totally outside the realm of the legal system.
191.
On current discourse regarding procedural rules in international commercial arbitration, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are Cross-Cultural Ethics Standards Possible or Desirable
in International Arbitration?, in Melanges en l’Honneur de Pierrie Tercier 883 (Peter
Gauch et al. eds., 2008).
192.
See Audley Sheppard, Arbitrator Independence in ICSID Arbitration, in International Investment Law for the 21st Century, supra note 178, at 131–56.
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enforcement of laws enacted pursuant to its Convention suggests a place
to begin the search.193 Perhaps a variation on that system might assure a
heightened sense of public duty and accountability on the part of the arbitrators asked to decide corruption cases.
The problem of the enforceability of judgments would be substantially diminished when the decision to reward the relator is rendered as
an arbitral award. The present Convention on Foreign Awards does vest
discretion in any enforcing court to refuse enforcement of arbitral
awards offending its notions of local public policy.194 It is clear that this
provision is intended to be read narrowly, and at least in the United
States it is.195 But an award might be denied enforcement by a court persuaded that the arbitral panel was itself corrupt or unqualified.

Conclusion
The World Bank, at least with the support of the International
Chamber of Commerce or the United Nations, could create a legal forum
in the ICSID model that could enable and reward effective private enforcement of international anticorruption law. The complexities of the
tasks are at least partially revealed above. But the needs clearly exist and
the time has come for serious consideration of the limited possibilities.
Others have noted the difficulty as well as the need for transnational institutions that might gain the requisite measure of trust from the
humanity whom they presume to govern.196 If such a legal forum were
created, it would need some of the features that cause plaintiffs “like
moths to the light” to be attracted to American courts. These might include a right of audience for contingent fee lawyers representing private
citizens or non-governmental organizations empowered to compel witness testimony and disclosures and to examine public and private files.
Such a means of private enforcement in an international forum would
not cure the infectious disease of corruption, but it would almost surely
reduce the suffering.

193.
See supra text accompanying note 61.
194.
New York Convention, supra note 181, art. V(2)(b).
195.
See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du
Papier (Ratka), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Europcar Italia, S.P.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc.,
156 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1998).
196.
See Robert A. Dahl, On Political Equality 87–92 (2006).

